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Corporate governance research address the nature of interactions and relationships 
between the firm and its stakeholders in the process of decision making and control over 
firm resources. In the corporate governance literature there has been a considerable 
interest in boards of directors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand, 
1996; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). The majority of board research has been 
dominated by economic theorizing with assumptions about rational and utility-
maximizing behavior. This stream of research put emphasizes on formal incentive and 
control mechanisms and a focus on how boards of directors may protect shareholder 
interests from opportunistic and self-serving managers through bonding or monitoring 
activities. The extensive body of empirical research conducted in this mainstream 
tradition has however so far yielded conflicting and ambiguous results.  
 
The general unease about the conflicting and ambiguous results has led to calls for new 
directions and alternative theorizing in research on boards and governance among a large 
number of scholars (Davis and Useem, 2002; Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Huse, 
2003; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; Davis, 2005). In line with these calls, a growing 
number of studies has emphasized the need to study behavioral processes and dynamics 
in and around the boardroom to better understand conditions for effective corporate 
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governance (e.g., Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Huse, 1998; Westphal 1998; Zajac and 
Westphal 1998; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Ocasio, 1999; 
Westphal 1999; Rindova, 1999; Westphal, Seidel and Stewart, 2001). However, so far 
these ‘behavioral’ studies of boards and governance are scattered across disciplines and 
research traditions, applying different methodologies and assumptions (Huse, 2005). As 
such, understanding boards and governance in behavioral framework does not yet provide 
a coherent alternative to the mainstream economic research tradition in corporate 
governance. 
 
In this review paper we will summarize and integrate previously published research with 
the aim to address the implications of a behavioral framework for a future research 
agenda on boards and governance. Based on the review we contend that a behavioral 
theory on boards and governance may underlie many features of an emerging stream of 
studies arguing that boards in reality may not be so much concerned with solving 
conflicts of interests but rather engaged in dealing with the complexity and uncertainty 
associated with strategic decision making (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999; 
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). The main feature characterizing the behavior of 
boards in a behavioral theory framework is the limited ability of organizational actors to 
effectively gather and process information. This will in turn lead to the need to collect 
and coordinate dispersed knowledge through planning and control procedures.  Corporate 
governance institutions, such as boards, can then be primarily conceived as problem-
solving institutions that reduce complexity, create accountability, and facilitate 
cooperation between stakeholders. Such a framework consequently challenges the 
mainstream approach that deals with boards primarily as a deterrent to managerial self-
interest in the context of rational optimizing behavior, formal contracts, and extrinsic 
(often monetary) rewards.  
 
We believe the paper contributes to research and literature on boards and governance in 
several ways. First, and in line with the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 
1963), the paper will develop theory of board behavior in a way that is more connected to 
empirical observation than mostly used in present research about boards. Up to date, 
 3
research on boards and governance has heavily relied on unquestioned behavioral 
assumptions (Pettigrew, 1992; Rindova, 1999), and a majority of empirical studies treat 
interactions and decision making processes largely as intervening unmeasured constructs 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). Second, a behavioral theory of 
boards and governance will imply an alternative economic approach to corporate 
governance institutions by starting from rather different behavioral assumptions. It will 
highlight the complexity of organizational activities vis-à-vis the limited cognitive 
capabilities of stakeholders and the search for knowledge to solve organizational 
problems (Rindova, 1999; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). As such, boards’ contribution to 
firm performance is expected to derive mainly from the deployment of relevant 
knowledge rather than from the reduction of agency costs. Third, a behavioral theory of 
boards and governance starts from the widely acknowledge idea that the purpose of 
corporate governance institutions is to enable cooperation. However, this takes place not 
only by solving conflicts among stakeholders and maintaining control, but also and 
perhaps even more importantly, by solving problems of coordination and engaging in 
collective processes of organized information-gathering (Rindova, 1999; Zahra and 
Filatotchev, 2004). Therefore, a behavioral theory of boards and governance will call for 
the need to revitalize concepts related to bounded rationality, satisficing behavior, 
routinization of decision-making by means of heuristics, and political bargaining in the 
context of the corporation as a coalition of stakeholders. These are concepts that have 
hardly been addressed in economic theorizing on boards and governance. 
 
The rest of this paper will be organized into four sections. In section two we will put the 
behavioral theoretical approach into perspective against major research streams in studies 
of boards and governance. Section three will then summarize main theoretic concepts 
from the behavioral theory of the firm that have been used in recent board research, 
which provide the basic ingredients for a behavioral theory on boards and governance. 
Thereafter, in section four we will discuss the different items on an emerging research 
agenda of a behavioral theory of boards and governance. The paper ends in section five 




2. Major research streams in studies of boards and governance 
 
Before outlining some fundamentals of a behavioral theory of boards and governance, we 
will put the behavioral theoretical approach into perspective against major research 
streams in contemporary studies of boards and governance. In order to structure our 
discussion we have, based on an elaboration of the perspectives presented by Zajac and 
Westphal (1998: 272), set out alternative research streams in Table 1 below. 
 
 (Insert table 1 about here) 
 
In dealing with the rights and responsibilities of stakeholders, corporate governance 
shapes relationships among stakeholders in an around the corporation in terms of 
structure, interactions and decisions (van Ees and Postma, 2004). Structure refers to the 
formal organization, i.e. the organizational design. Interactions refer to the interplay 
between actors being or working close together. Decisions refer to the making and 
shaping of strategic decisions and the processes through which these decisions evolve. 
The column dimension in Table 1 shows this distinction, whereas the row dimension 
characterizes the focus on either internal or external relationships. Internal relationships 
refer to relationships in and around the board, between board members and (coalitions of) 
internal actors, as well as the relationships between (coalitions of) board members. 
External relationships refer to relationships between board members and (coalitions of) 
external actors. 
 
The idea to distinguish between external and internal actors in research on corporate 
governance has its background in the potential conflict of interest between different 
organizational actors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A common way to identify internal 
and external actors is to make the distinction based on whether they operate within the 
strategic apex of the company - those who make decisions and take actions, or if they are 
placed outside this apex - those who seek to influence and control decisions and actions 
(i.e., Mintzberg, 1983; Huse, 2000). Shareholders are often considered to be the most 
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important external stakeholders or actors, but the list of external stakeholders may as well 
include customers, suppliers, competitors, tax collectors and other state agents (Freeman 
and Reed, 1983; Huse and Rindova, 2001). The CEO and the top management team are 
often considered as the most important internal stakeholder, but in many cases owners 
can also be considered internal stakeholders. This is particularly the case in family firms 
and firms with concentrated ownership, which can be found in many small firms 
(Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005). In the list of internal stakeholders we may also find the 
families of the executives, and other with close psychological and financial ties to the 
CEO and the top management team (Kosnik, 1987). It is furthermore argued that 
workers, most often regardless of their relationships with the management, should be 
regarded as internal stakeholders. 
 
Corporate governance research is dominated by economic theories, which assumes that a 
firm functions in line with its formal structure (Daily et al, 2003). The first entry (I) in 
table 1 concerns research on incentive and control problems within the firm, which is the 
classical domain of positivist agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The focus is on the contract between principals (the owners of the firm) and agents (the 
top management). Agency theory posits that this relationship may be subject to 
inefficiencies to the extent that principals and agents have conflicting goals. The actors 
are assumed to act opportunistic and intendedly rational, and asymmetric information 
prevents effective monitoring of the agents’ actions by the principals. The solutions to 
these problems have been to develop formal incentive and control mechanisms and to 
emphasize the formal monitoring role of the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 
The second entry in the table (II) concerns the formal structure of the corporation vis-à-
vis its external stakeholders. The corporation is regarded as a focal point of contracts and 
likewise the dominating theories in this field are transactions costs economics and 
contract theory (Williamson, 1984, 1988). As in the previous entry, actors are assumed to 
act intendedly rationally so as to maximize their own benefits under conditions of 
incomplete or asymmetric information. The design of corporate governance regulation, 
such as corporate governance legislation and national codes of corporate governance that 
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structure and codify the relationships between the corporation and its external 
stakeholders is considered as part of this research field (Blair and Stout, 2001; Callison, 
2001). 
 
Whereas the first two entries of Table 1 are dominated by the economic discipline, the 
question of how interactions affect relationships in and around the boardroom have 
primarily been studied from a sociological perspective. Studies in the third entry (III) 
have been concerned with conditions for collaboration and conflict between boards and 
internal stakeholders, with a focus on how issues like CEO duality, CEO tenure and 
experience, social ties, demographic similarity and timing of directors’ appointment 
affect power and politics in the organization (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; Westphal 
and Zajac, 1995; Zajac and Westphal, 1996; Bigley and Wiersema, 2002). The power and 
trust characteristics of CEO-board relationships have for example been considered by 
stewardship theory and social exchange theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Westphal and Zajac, 1997). Noteworthy is that 
although these theoretical perspectives often have completely opposite behavioral 
assumptions when compared to agency theory, they are often considered complementary 
rather than competing perspectives for understanding conditions for effective board 
governance (e.g., Shen, 2003; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). 
 
The fourth entry (IV) concerns coordination and cooptation through interorganizational 
networks, with a focus on how power, trust and resources flow between organizations and 
make them work together so as to increase organizational effectiveness. This issue has 
primarily been analyzed in the context of resource dependency theory, which was 
developed in the 1970s as an attempt to explain how organizations seek to connect to 
their environment in order to secure a stable flow of resources (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Provan 1980). From the resource dependency perspective, 
effective boards link the organization with its environment by establishing important 
contacts and providing access to timely information through personal and professional 
networks (Boyd, 1990; Hillman, Canella and Paetzold, 2000). One way of linking the 
organization with its environment is by means of co-opting representatives from 
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important external organizations. These co-optation practices can be seen as instrumental 
acts with the purpose to reduce uncertainty, acquire resources, or diffuse information in 
order to achieve organizational goals (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The extensive research 
on director interlocks is a related stream of studies that provides further insight into the 
power dynamics associated with multiple board memberships (Useem, 1984; Richardson, 
1997; Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Mizruchi, 1996; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; 
Zajac and Westphal, 1996; Gulati and Westphal, 1999). Especially, these studies have 
focused on how director interlocks influence the diffusion of technology, policy and 
strategy, as well as providing a social context that favor continued managerial 
dominance. 
 
The remaining entries (V and VI) of Table 1 deal with the making and shaping of 
organizational decisions and the processes through which these decisions evolve among 
internal and external stakeholders. Entry V concerns studies that are about decision 
making in and around the boardroom and belong somewhat more to the domain of social 
psychology. The contradictory findings in mainstream governance research have fueled 
the idea that ambiguity exists because of the complexities of board decision making 
(Huse, 1998). Many scholars have emphasized that there is no other way to analyze this 
proposition than to focus on actual decision-making behavior and the underlying 
cognitive processes of boards (e.g. Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Rindova, 1999; Pye and 
Pettigrew, 2005). Although empirical research on these issues is still scarce, existing 
studies have primarily focused on how commitment, cohesiveness and shared values as 
well as creativity, criticality and cognitive conflicts among board members influence 
board behavior (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Huse, 1998; Pettigrew and McNulty, 
1998; McNulty and Pettigrew and 1999; Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; Huse, 
Minichilli and Schøning, 2005). 
 
Finally, entry VI concerns processes of conformation and ceremony vis-à-vis external 
stakeholders. The main perspective in this entry has been institutional theory, a 
theoretical perspective that addresses how interdependencies between corporate and other 
societal institutions make organizations conform to the accepted norms of their 
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populations (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983). Through this perspective, board appointments 
and social network ties are seen as embedded in the broader institutional environment. 
This enables board members to learn about existing norms of appropriate beliefs and 
behavior (eg., Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Westphal, et al., 2001; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Jonnegård, Kärreman and Svensson, 2004). Board members persuade 
each other that certain corporate governance structures and policies have merit even if 
evidence for their efficiency is lacking. Boards may in this respect be subject to processes 
of social construction where the adoption of practices fulfills symbolic rather than or in 
addition to efficiency requirements (Westphal et al, 2001; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004). Director interlocks can consequently, from this perspective, be expected to 
encourage imitation not only through conscious choice but also by triggering the adoption 
of taken-for-granted board behavior through less explicit socialization processes 
(Westphal, et al, 2001). An alternative perspective in this entry focuses on the field of 
rhetoric and impression management (eg., Zajac and Westphal, 1994; Westphal and 
Zajac, 1998; Ng and DeCock, 2002; Pye, 2002; Pye, 2004). This perspective study the 
use of practices of symbolic management as an instrument to connect the decisions and 
behavior of the organization to the expectations, rules and norms in the business-
environment, thereby taking into account the special order and formal behavior 
demanded by custom.  
 
In our view, behavioral perspectives alternative to mainstream economic theorizing on 
boards and governance can be found in the various research themes in entries III-VI. In 
fact, the idea that the underlying theories provide complementary perspectives on boards 
and governance and that neither one of them can independently provide a full explanation 
seem to have gained common ground (e.g., Hung, 1998; Stiles, 2001; Lynall, Golden and 
Hillman, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2005). There has been a growing 
consensus concerning the need for theoretical pluralism and researchers can today choose 




Our discussion illustrates the argument that behavioral studies of corporate governance 
are scattered across disciplines and research traditions, applying different methodologies 
and behavioral assumptions. Theory development about boards and governance should 
focus on similarities and not on differences. Despite good intentions we fear that without 
the accumulation of knowledge around commonly accepted core concepts the call for 
theoretical pluralism may risk leading to a growing fragmentation rather than to a 
growing consensus in the understanding of board behavior. As such, current behavioral 
perspectives in research of boards and governance do not provide an alternative to the 
mainstream economic research tradition in corporate governance. In our view, a 
behavioral theory of boards and governance, focusing on the similarities rather than on 
pluralism and differences in the various approaches may be able to provide such an 
alternative. In the next section, we will discuss concepts originating from the behavioral 
theory of the firm that may potentially serve as underlying concepts for an emerging 
behavioral theory of boards and governance.  
 
3. Behavioral theoretic concepts used in recent board research 
 
The behavioral theory of the firm has since the pioneering studies of Simon (1945, 1955), 
March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March (1963) been developed into a main 
perspective for understanding decision making in organizations. The work of Simon and 
others can be considered as an attempt to link the abstract principles of the rational 
decision-making model in the economic discipline to concrete decision-making processes 
in real business settings. Yet little of this rich body of knowledge has spilled over to 
mainstream studies of boards and governance where the rationality of agents often still is 
assumed (Ocasio, 1999). However, in line with calls for the need to better capture 
processes and behavioral dynamics in and around the boardroom (e.g., Pettigrew, 1992; 
Huse, 1998) studies have increasingly emphasized the need to apply concepts that can be 
related back to a behavioral theoretical framework. Four important core concepts 
originating from a behavioral tradition that have appeared in recent research on boards 
are examined below; bounded rationality (Ocasio, 1999; Osterloh, Frey and Frost, 2000; 
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Hendry, 2003), satisficing (Hendry, 2005), routines (Ocasio, 1999; Zahra and Filatotchev, 
2004), and political bargaining (Huse and Rindova, 2001). 
 
Bounded rationality. Recent research on boards and governance has addressed the core 
concept of bounded rationality (Ocasio, 1999; Osterloh et al., 2000; Hendry, 2005), 
which is a concept that refers to the actual complexity of decision-making in 
organizations (Simon, 1955, March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963). This is 
not to say that agents do not strive to maximize utility, only that real-world agents are not 
able to do so due to bounds on their intended rationality (Hendry, 2005). The complexity 
of the business makes it impossible for individuals to completely understand all linkages 
among variables around them. In this respect, the concept of bounded rationality 
emphasizes that organizational actors do not fully understand the world they are living in 
(Hendry, 2003). This has two implications, in particular. In the first place, decisions 
cannot be regarded as optimal solutions to problems - they can merely reflect solutions 
that satisfy particular aspiration levels (Cyert and March, 1963; see also Levinthal and 
March, 1993). These aspiration levels are determined both by history and the social 
environment. The historical aspiration level is set as a function of the organizations past 
performance, the social aspiration level is set by reference to meaningful reference 
groups. In the second place, and contrary to mainstream economic theorizing with its 
emphasis on  individual super-rationality in the face of incomplete and asymmetric 
information (Eisenhardt, 1989), a behavioral approach focuses more on subjective factors 
such as cognitive biases, and incompetence, as explanations for inefficient and ineffective 
decision-making (Hendry, 2002; Foss, 2001). The cognitive bias of organizational actors 
only allows imperfect mapping of the decision-making environment and a rather limited 
and imprecise and selective information processing. From this perspective, the limited 
competence and unawareness among organizational members may represent a much 
more likely cause of organizational failures and inefficiencies than straightforward 
opportunism, which more or less assumes that individuals have full understanding of the 
opportunities available to them (c.f. Hendry, 2002). This notion of bounded rationality 




Satisficing. A second core concept that has been addressed in recent research on boards 
and governance is ‘satisficing’ (Hendry, 2005). This behavioral concept indicates that 
actors tend to accept choices or judgments that are “good enough” based on their most 
important current needs rather than searching for optimal solutions. The assumption of 
satisficing behavior rests on the observation that decision-makers mainly are concerned 
with immediate problems and short-run solutions, something which has generally been 
called “problemistic search” (Cyert and March, 1963). Problems are, however, only 
recognized to the extent that organizations fail to satisfy one or more of its self-imposed 
goals, or when such failure can be expected in a near future (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Problem recognition itself is primarily driven by attention allocation and selection biases. 
When faced with a problem, decision makers can be expected to search for solutions 
using simple heuristics or decision-making routines. The problem is regarded as solved as 
soon as an alternative is found that satisfies current goals, or if goals are revised to a level 
that makes available solutions acceptable. When compared to optimizing behavior it can 
be observed that satisficing behavior potentially reduces the gains from behaving 
opportunistically. Decision making in the behavioral theory is consequently seen as an 
experiential learning process, where firms adapt incrementally to its changing 
environment through learning and experimentation. Decision makers learn by trial and 
error what can be done, and they adapt their goals, attention rules and search rules 
accordingly. 
 
Routines. A third core concept that has been brought up to attention in recent research is 
that boards of directors operate from the basis of ‘routines’1 that are built up over time 
(Ocasio, 1999; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). Routines can here be understood as the 
codified memory of the organization, embodying the past experience, knowledge, beliefs, 
values, and capabilities of the organization and its decision makers (March and Simon, 
1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 2003). Routines consist for a large part 
of experiential knowledge, which to a large extent are tacit and hard to codify. Routines 
                                                 
1 “Routines” has in the literature also been referred to as “performance programs” (March and Simon, 
1958), “standard operating procedures” (Cyert and March, 1963). 
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are moreover an important a source of control and stability, which both enable and 
constrain organizational action. On the one hand, they conserve the cognitive abilities of 
board members and channel and limit conflict among them. On the other hand, they 
direct attention to selected aspects of identified problem situations. Rules and routines are 
hence not purely passive elements in board behavior, but serve as socially and historically 
constructed programs of action that direct attention to selected aspects of a problem 
situation. As such, they also create decision-making biases. Boards, however, are not 
victims of history - routines can be changed by learning processes, such as imitation, or 
through trial and error (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004).  Both routinization as well as 
unlearning thus plays a central role in a behavioral framework. 
 
Political bargaining. The fourth core concept that has been addressed in recent research 
on boards is the ‘political bargain’ among coalitions of actors (Huse and Rindova, 2001). 
Through this perspective organizations can be depicted as complex political systems with 
agents organized in coalitions, some of them organized into subcoalitions (March, 1962; 
Cyert and March, 1963). Coalition partners may have distinct preferences and objectives, 
which make negotiation and bargaining among coalition members common practice. 
Shifting coalitions of organizational actors affect organizational decisions, goal setting 
and problem solving processes. Goal conflicts are solved through political bargain rather 
than through objective alignment by economic incentives. Disagreement about 
organizational goals is dealt with in the context of on-going bargaining processes among 
coalitions that pursue alternative objectives and priorities. Different coalitions may 
pursue conflicting goals, and organizations may encompass a variety of possibly 
conflicting and inconsistent goals by pursuing them sequentially. Goal formation is thus 
achieved by a series of procedures including the application of local rationality and 
acceptable level decision rules, as well as sequential attention to goals (Cyert and March, 
1963). The procedures for resolving conflicts do not necessarily lead to a consistent set of 
goals in the organization. This means that organizations most of the time can be expected 
to have a considerable amount of latent conflicts and goals. Goal formation is hence seen 
as the outcome rather than the beginning of the bargain between coalitions. As such, goal 
formation and goal conflict may drive the search for additional information and new 
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knowledge. In fact, from such a learning perspective, goal congruence and consensus 
may even be a hindrance rather than a stimulus to organizational development. In view of 
their formal role as “the strategic apex” of the organization, board of directors obviously 
will play an important role in this process of goal formation. 
 
(Insert table 2 about here) 
 
A comparison between assumptions for understanding decision making in the economic 
and behavioral approach is presented in table 2 above. In the behavioral approach actors 
are assumed to be constrained by limited imagination and awareness, so called truly 
bounded rationality. Due to the constraints of truly bounded rationality, organizational 
actors seldom base decision making on an overall calculation of all consequences. 
Instead, if a problem area is recognized it triggers a search for possible solutions and the 
search ends when a “satisfactory” solution is found. The actors moreover rely on routines 
and heuristics that provide them with readily available solutions and procedures for the 
enactment of organizational decisions. Finally conflict resolution and goal formation is 
seen as the result of an ongoing process of political bargain among coalition members. 
The assumption made in the in the economic approach that organizations are monolithic 
entities where individuals rationally make optimal decisions to reach a unified and a 
priori defined goal is consequently rejected. Among other things, this has important 
implications for a research agenda based on a behavioral theory of boards and 
governance. 
 
4. A research agenda of a behavioral theory of boards and governance 
 
Building upon the four core concepts developed in the previous section, a research 
agenda of a behavioral theory of boards and governance will be based on the conception 
of organizations as multiple coalitions of stakeholders. These stakeholders may have 
conflicting interests and will achieve their goals through changing coalitions in the 
bargaining process within the corporation. The behavioral perspective on boards and 
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governance would hence primarily place emphasis on the analysis of the role of the board 
in organizational decision making rather than on the outcomes (performance) of boards. 
 
In explaining decisions, a behavioral theory of boards and governance will focus on the 
political aspects of board behavior. A behavioral theory of boards and governance may in 
this setting analyze boards’ involvement in political bargaining in order to achieve 
cooperation between coalitions of actors (Ocasio, 1999; Hendry, 2002). Following upon 
the analysis of power and trust relationships the analysis can be extended to the more 
managerial aspects of political behavior, such as how the symbolic, rather than 
substantive aspects of stakeholder behavior and expectations may be managed to benefit 
the interests of the dominant coalition within the organization (Huse and Eide, 1996). In 
the political bargain, the position of the board cannot be regarded as non-problematic. 
Indeed, the formal role of the board is to consider “the best interest of the firm” only, 
however, in a political context the question as to what the best interest of the firm is 
cannot be answered without reference to context and the particular coalition of 
stakeholders (Huse and Rindova, 2001). That is to say that the best interest of the firm are 
to defined in the political bargain among stakeholders, which implies that the objectives 
of the firms cannot be regarded as the objective fundamentals for board decision-making. 
It also implies that the effectiveness of board decision-making can not be analyzed 
without taking board decision-making context into account (Huse, 2005). 
 
In mediating between stakeholders, boards can in a behavioral theoretic framework be 
expected to engage in problemistic search to create momentary stable coalitions of 
stakeholders that provide a solution to the problem at hand. The bargaining process starts 
with defining corporate goals from the aspiration levels and expectations of stakeholders. 
Problemistic search by the board will be triggered when organizational performance will 
fall below stakeholder aspiration levels. The search for workable problem-solving 
heuristics will be aimed at finding solutions to immediate problems of accountability. As 
such, the behavioral approach emphasizes the political process involved in board decision 
making (Ocasio, 1994; Huse, 1996; Ng and DeCock 2002) and the satisficing nature of 
board decision-making outcomes (Hendry, 2005). Satisficing as the guiding principle for 
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decision-making, instead of trying to capture all opportunities to maximize payoffs 
probably may reduce opportunism between organizational actors (Baumol, 2004).  
 
Alignment with sub-goals rather than to a profit objective may moreover help keeping 
focus on tasks and duties in the organization and in sustaining intrinsic motivation 
(Grandori, 2004; Osterloh and Frey, 2004; Windolf, 2004). Thus, the analysis of how 
boards organize goal formation within the organization as well as the position and 
political role in the context of this process may reveal additional insight into the role of 
the board in organizational decision-making. Moreover, the existence of alternative goals 
in the behavioral approach may provide important inputs for additional information and 
knowledge. In fact, the diversity of goals among different coalitions of actors can be 
considered beneficial as it stimulates the discovery and active search for new knowledge 
as a by-product in the goal-conflict resolution process. Diverse board members with 
experiences from different industries and companies will vary in their domain 
knowledge, the problems they have been exposed to and the problem solving skills they 
have developed (Rindova, 1999). New knowledge can in this respect enter into the board 
decision-making process through the adjustment of aspiration levels and the formation of 
alternative dominant coalitions. These conditions will in turn bring greater variety to the 
problems that the board identifies and the solutions it develops. 
 
Additionally, analyzing problem-solving inside and outside the boardroom through a 
behavioral theoretic framework may offer new insights into the specific behaviors and 
actions of board members that lead to certain decision of boards of directors (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999).  Satisficing board members can be expected to deal with organizational 
problems by applying norms, problem-solving heuristics and memorized routines to 
reduce the complexity of decision-making. The limits of bounded rationality prohibit the 
availability and understanding of a complete array of alternatives, which means that 
simple heuristics will be used to process the gathered information. A behavioral theory of 
boards and governance will thus emphasize that board members rely on general rules and 
lessons based on past experience (heuristics) to make strategic decisions, rather than 
employing rational models of decision making that require knowledge and information 
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that they cannot have. In particular, the decisions in the current period are informed and 
shaped by the environmental feedback that board members receive from their earlier 
decisions (Cyert and March, 1963). Learning processes among board members can hence 
be expected to be “operationalized” in the form of information gathering and decision 
making structures, procedures and rules (Ocasio, 1999). 
 
A behavioral theory of boards and governance also posit that board members cope with 
uncertainty and complexity reduction by routinely simplifying and structuring 
information through their perceptual filters and pre-existent knowledge structures 
(Rindova, 1999). By applying simple decision-making heuristics directors may enact 
decision-making scripts internalized from their participation on other boards to solve 
strategy and monitoring problems in the current organization or board. This follows the 
idea that the particular decision routines are encoded more deeply in the organizational 
memory, and more likely to be recalled and enacted later in problem situation that are 
perceived as similar. The reliance of rules in board decision making facilitates action by 
presenting board members with readily available solutions for organizational problems 
(Ocasio, 1999) and may also increase the board’s ability to justify and defend its actions 
and decisions (Westphal and Zajac, 1998). As such, the previous experiences of board 
members, their expectations and reference groups, as well as their routine procedures for 
information processing and learning, are highly relevant to consider for understanding 
board decision-making. The careful analysis of behavioral routines and mimetic 
processes in and around boards may thus provide insight how boards and their members 
routinely use their past experiences in similar settings as scripts for solving problems in 
the current situation (Ocasio, 1999; Westphal, et al., 2001). Similarly, the analysis of 
norms of board behavior as another source of memorized socially constructed 
expectations may reveal additional insights as far as the explanation of behavior in and 
around boards is concerned. 
 
5. Concluding summary 
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There have been calls for new directions and alternative theorizing in research on boards 
and governance (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). In this 
article we have outlined a behavioral theory of boards and governance which in many 
ways challenges the mainstream approach for understanding boards and governance in 
contemporary research.  First of all, a behavioral theory of boards and governance will be 
more focused on the interactions and decisions among actors in and around the 
boardroom (behavior), rather than on the outcomes (performance) of boards. Most studies 
that have studied boards from an economic perspective have more or less neglected board 
behavior. Instead they have analyzed the relationships between ideal-typical board 
constructs and corporate performance, and applied unquestioned behavioral assumptions 
as a basis for prescription where interaction, communication and information sharing 
between board members have generally not been assumed to affect the board’s work 
(Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). In contrast, 
for a behavioral theory of boards and governance the actual interactions and behavioral 
processes in and around boards will be the starting point (Huse, 2005). However, 
emphasis on actual board behavior is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a 
behavioral theory of boards and governance. The challenge is to go beyond simple 
description by using a limited set of behavioral constructs to explain the decision-making 
of boards as well as the role of boards in organizational decision-making. The key 
constructs in this respect are bounded rationality, satisficing behavior, routinization of 
decision-making by means of heuristics, and political bargaining in the context of the 
corporation as a coalition of stakeholders. Alike the behavioral theory of the firm the 
processes of past-performance evaluation in the context of boards, the search for 
alternatives and the decision-making routines and procedures in and around boards will 
consequently constitute the core of the new research agenda. 
 
To position this endeavor, it can first be argued that a behavioral perspective on boards 
and governance will focus on decision making processes over structure and outcome. If 
structure exists it is however because actors are constructing and reconstructing intentions 
and accounts and, thereby, their own and others’ identities. Much more emphasis would 
also be placed on the effects of past behavior and experience on current behavior in and 
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around boards. As such, the emphasis on context and history in the behavioral perspective 
on boards and governance stands in contrast to a more axiomatic approach basically in 
economics, where the corporation is a “focus for a complex process in which the 
conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may ‘represent’ other organizations) 
are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976: 311). 
 
In the second place, a behavioral perspective will accept that board decision-making 
behavior is contingent upon the modes of interaction among various actors. The relative 
power and relationships between various coalitions of internal and external actors may be 
contingent upon the different stages of the firm’s development (Dyer, 1986; Huse, 1998; 
Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004), and board composition may reflect the wider power 
relationship between internal and external actors at the time of board formation (Lynall, 
Golden and Hillman, 2001). The power and influence of the board of directors may 
change in times of crisis compared to normal times, and various types of crises may 
change the stakes, power and activities of various actors (Lorsch and McIver, 1989; 
Mace, 1971). Consequently, the goals and objectives of the organization shift as 
coalitions change. Hence, contingencies related to the firm’s industry, as well as the 
firm’s life cycle might affect interactions and relationships among stakeholders in an 
around the corporation (Lynall et al, 2001; Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). 
 
In the third place, a behavioral perspective would allow for cooperative as well as 
conflicting interests to enter into the process of board decision making and control over 
firm resources. A behavioral theory of boards and governance would, in addition to 
dealing with conflicts resulting from divergent preferences of stakeholders, emphasize 
board members’ contribution in dealing with the complexity and uncertainty associated 
with strategic decisions. Because organizational actors have limited cognitive capacity 
they need planning and control routines to help them analyze complex tasks and to avoid 
making errors in decision making. The conflicting goals among organizational actors also 
imply a conflict of cognitive resources, such as for example access to attention, 
knowledge and memory, which in turn influence the perception, or “framing”, of the 
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problem situation (Lindenberg, 2003). Participation in the early stages of strategic 
decision making will in this respect enable board members to protect stakeholders’ 
interests through problem identification and problem definition (Rindova, 1999). This 
suggests that board members contribute to the problem solving process because they offer 
a variety of experiences and quality of judgment which in turn makes them perform their 
monitoring tasks more effective (Andrew, 1980). As such, board members use the 
strategic problem-solving expertise they have developed in their primary occupations and 
provide inputs into the cognitive tasks through which strategic decision making is carried 
out (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Rindova, 1999). Therefore, in a behavioral perspective 
the emphasis on conflict and control in the boardroom will be less, and problems of 
coordination, exploration and creating value or knowledge may dominate over problems 
of conflict, exploitation and the distribution of value. 
 
To conclude this essay, the relevant characteristics of the axiomatic perspective and the 
behavioral perspective on boards and governance are presented in Table 3 below. It is our 
belief that the two perspectives represent markedly different and equally viable streams in 
research on boards and governance. At the same time, Table 3 can be considered as an 
open invitation for additional research and analysis on the topics formulated in the cells 
representing the behavioral perspective. It is our hope that the arguments underlying these 
topics may add new perspectives to the existing research agenda on boards and 
governance. 
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Table 1: Major Themes in Research on Boards and Governance 









































IV. Coordination and 
cooptation 
 
-Social networks and 
director interlocks 
-Social elites and 
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The firm as a nexus of contracts 
 
 
The firms as a nexus of coalitions 
 
 
Uniform decision-making structures, 
designs and ideal-typical behaviors 
 
 
Political decision-making processes, 
procedures and contexts 
 




Emphasis on goal formation through 
political bargain. 
 




Decision making that are “good enough” 
given bounds on human rationality 
 
 
Boards protect value through monitoring 
 
 
Boards create value through problemistic 
search for  new information 
 
 




Focus on decision making (behavior) 
 
 
 
 
